The Field Scene has Dominated A State of Operational Silence- by the Resistance- from the Return of the War on the Gaza Strip Ultil the Date of Writing the article, As We Did Not Witness the Same Operational Momentum that we have seen in the Fifteen Months of the War that preceded the Truce of the Sixty Days Sparked A State of Question and Controversy about the Capabilities of the Resistance On the Continue Defense Operations Against the Invading Forces, and People Divided Between, complaint, Vilipéndé and satirique.
What is the reason for the decrease in the frequency of the military operations of the resistance, despite the passage of about 20 days since the return of the war, the expansion of the enemy, its land operations in Rafah and its three military teams in all areas of the band: (Division 36 in the south of the band, the 252nd division in the sector, and the 162nd division), and it began a new operation called (Maraj)?
Why does resistance not face enemy forces? Is it a strong weakness of its capacities to this degree? Or is it a new followed tactic based on patience and waiting before engaging in battle?
To answer these questions, it is important first to resolve two military concepts; The first is one of the types of defense, and it is a flexible defense, and the second is one of the origins of war, and it is the origin of the economy in power.
By reading the defensive Context of the Resistance Operations Sale the Beginning of the Israeli Land Operation On the Night of Octuber 27, 2023, It can be Easily Seen that the resistance Fought-for the First Time in Its History- from the First Meter of the Defense Area, and Hit Strikes Street, Land and Alley in All Areas of Incceion, and the Enemy Did not success in Exceding Any Defensive Formula Without the Respected Expected Losses in Its Ranks, Whether in Areas Insurance, front defense zones or depth defense areas.
The dismantling of a battalion of the twenty-four defense brigades, from Beit Hanoun to the north, south of the Sultan, was not recorded at the end of the battle. The ISRAELIAN BLINDED brigade 401.
With the passage of the months of the battle of the deluge of Al -Aqsa, and by reading the tactics of defensive resistance during the battle, it is possible to examine the diversity of methods and tactics that the resistance followed in its military operations, which are characterized by its indirect nature by engaging with the enemy.
Among these elements, it is not a question of preserving fixed defensive sites, and the transition from the fixed defense of flexible defense, and waiting and waiting before launching a great attack on the scale, and chasing enemy forces each time a real opportunity allows damage, which has been described by one of the enemy generals saying that: “Hamas is fight of combat.
This dynamic transformation of training, structure and model of the fight against resistance forces, allows it to adapt to the development of the operational situation during the fighting, and even helps it to maintain the element of surprise and initiative, and to maintain the enemy in a state of anxiety of the unknown, which is an essential component of irregular war tactics.
This reading means that the defense methods valid at the start of the battle are no longer valid in the months that followed, and that the tactics of the Gaza and Northern brigade, differ from combat tactics in the Khan Yunis and Rafah brigade, but the tactics differ in the brigade itself with the change of enemy tactics, and even tactics differ in the same battle.
This can be easily seen if the methods of fighting resistance are compared to the first battle of Jabalia in November, Jabalia’s second battle in May and the third Battle of Jabalia in November in the general plan.
Given the defense methods, resistance movements generally – in particular with the duration of fighting and the decrease in resources – adopt the elastic defense method, unlike the regular armies which depend on the fixed defense style in many battles, and it concerns the requirements of flexible defense: maneuver with the best possible way, and investing them tactical on enemy weaknesses, rather than wasting force in tactical tactical places and do not cause strong losses.
As for the power economy, it concerns the use of the least possible quantity of energy resources in terms of weapons, combatants and infrastructure to achieve the defense objectives in a manner that does not lead to the exhaustion of resources, for the exhaustion of forces and in a way that allows forces to perpetuate fighting for the longest possible.
Due to the lack of supply lines to resistance, operational reality imposes a greater need for work according to this origin of the origins of war, and the resistance was adopted in the battle of the brigade of Khan Yunis before the hostile forces of the 98th division, and it was also approved in the battle of the Rafah brigade which presents itself at the time of hostile time of 162 years, when the enemy From the time that has the hostile time of 162, the brigades of the two brigades pulled three quarters of the fighters and kept a quarter of the defense force to exercise tasks to defend the theaters of operations.
With regard to the long and complex battle for the resistance and the enemy, military attrition was one of the essential hosts in which the parties to the fighting ran, and it was noted that the resistance had developed its tactics during the war the most famous to avoid the attrition, in return, Israel was forced to coincide with the fight against the most (Lebanon, the Syria, Syria, greater quantity of front, which showed the elements of the bose the crisis of enemy exhaustion, in particular in the ranks of the reserves, was the predominant that the long armistice would be followed by a ceasefire, or at least of a longer break, but reserve fighters and regular forces – both – collided with the return of fights, and Israel based on In Gaza, which is a major training, compared to nature.
The Israeli crowd and the attack on the Rafah region refer to a scene in which Israel pushes great strengths, capacities, ammunition and plans, and the exhaustion bill pushes to its account, while the resistance retains its forces, its capacities and its level of enemy forces.
Throughout the months of the war, many questions have been asked about the capacities of the resistance, in particular with Israeli propaganda, which focused strongly on the success of Israeli army operations to undermine and destroy these capacities, but many proofs that have been frequent during the battle have proven to be the opposite.
For example, Beit Hanoun recorded one of the largest losses in the Israeli army in the wild operation a few hours before the armistice, killing about 10 Israeli soldiers in just 72 hours, the city that Israeli forces attacked the first night of the first stage.
Through the Foregoing, it is possible to reach an estimate that the state of operational silence of the resistance palls with the scope of a defensive tactic, and not because of an operational or organizational deficit, in order to achieve the goals of attrition, survival and breaking the will of the fight Was Not A Defensive Fit For the Resistance in the Previous Months of the War, is no long Valid TODAY, and therefore the abandonment of the land and the withdrawal of the tactics of the defense areas are preferred to defense in all defense. Coordination of the defense “from edge to the nucleus”, in order to achieve the objectives of critical strikes and to cause heavy losses as much as possible.
This defense model allows the optimal use of resources that have been drained from a good quantity and to reduce material and human losses to the extent that allows the sustainability of the as much possible fighting possible, and this model also allows – if its success proves – an effective tool to support negotiation positions in the political and military context.
When defense forces show their ability to absorb pressure and initiative to carry out targeted and studied defensive operations, they underline their possession of the strategic initiative, giving political leaders a place of force to the negotiation table. This capacity does not reflect simple defensive resilience, but rather an advanced combat dynamic which imposes itself on the enemy and restores the balance of powers.
In addition, this combat model contributes to influencing Israeli internal opinion, which does not give more than ever to the army of previous legitimacy, which has become more sensitive to the losses of the army in war, since the current war has become absurd and does not serve the entity as much as it served a personal agenda of Netanyahu and Israeli law.
This model also contributes to breaking the destructive American position on the idea of returning military operations, because the American and current administration is engaged in a vision that military operations are unable to achieve the objectives of war, and that the political process is the most important and the first.
This was expressed by former American Secretary of State Anthony Blinkin and former Secretary in the United States of Defense Lloyd Austin saying: the tactical achievements made by the Israeli army in Gaza would not only dissipate, but would also turn into a major defeat if they are not invested by a political path.
The opinions of the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al-Jazeera.