Why did Trump go back to negotiations with Iran? | policy

The first series of negotiations between Tehran and the administration of President Trump, which was held in Oman, ended six years after President Trump withdrew from the Iranian nuclear agreement in 2018 during his first presidential mandate. This agreement, which was held between Iran and group 5 + 1 (permanent membership of the Security Council and in Germany) in 2015.

What is new in this area is not only negotiations in its importance, but the Trump initiative to send a message to Tehran through the United Arab Emirates, in which he urges the Iranian management to negotiate, although in the language of threat and promises, which is his style that we are accustomed recently.

Trump began contacts with Tehran, and the date and location of negotiations were set at Oman on Saturday April 12, and urgently, Trump called the Prime Minister of Occupation, Benjamin Netanyahu, in Washington on April 7, and informed him of the in progress contacts with Tehran, and that he was determined to proceed with the man who helped the president Remove from the nuclear agreement that Barack Obama has blessed in a timely manner.

During his second visit to the White House, Netanyahu seemed uncomfortable with his meeting with Trump in front of the press, he was therefore little speech, indicating at the same time that he hoped that the Iranian nuclear project will be treated and that the Libyan nuclear project was treated in 2003; In other words, dismantling the entire parts of the project, transporting it and centrifugal devices in the United States of America.

With regard to the Iranian nuclear file, President Trump had previously identified the Israeli vision led by Benjamin Netanyahu by withdrawing from the agreement and imposing serious sanctions on Iran, although the agreement practically abolished Teheran’s capacity to make a nuclear bomb, according to the limits and conditions of the signal agreement, and the nature of the international nuclear projection.

But Trump in 2018, as an Israeli occupation, saw that this agreement offered economic advantages to Tehran by making it sanctions, which has strengthened its influence and its strength in the region by participating in the revolutionary guards, its political alliances, and its support for his friends in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, that Tel Aviv was seen with anxiety, Crescent of Hezbollah.

Now, six years after Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, a number of changes to Tehran and his allies have occurred, the Trump administration motivated the negotiation procedure he had already seen is useless and these changes:

• The loss of Tehran of his Bashar Al -Assad ally, and his loss of Syria as an allied country after the success of the Revolution against the Assad regime, is considered a strategic loss of heavy caliber for Iran, Syria has a political and geographic weight in the east of its land.
• The weakness of the Lebanese Hezbollah, after the battle of the flood of Al -aqsa – in which he participated through the fierce transmission chain, where Israel ordered military security strikes on surprising in which he destroyed a large number of leaders of the two lines; The first and the second, led by the secretary general, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah – also constituted a great loss for Iran, which invested in the party and politically Lebanon and security during the decades.

Hezbollah was a thorn in the throat of Israel, and its strength was invested in Iran in its political accounts and negotiated on its nuclear project with America, the ally and the strategic sponsor of occupied Israel.

• The United States of America has targeted Yemen and the friends of Tehran de Houthis; During the month of the launch of military operations against Yemen, the American navy has targeted more than 300 targets, and bombing operations continue, in order to neutralize Yemen in the support of Gaza and to deny it the capacity to threaten the American and Israeli navigation through the sea of ​​Arabia and the Red Sea.

The bombing of Yemen in itself brings a message to Tehran, that Washington is serious about the use of military force, at a time when its shells, its aircraft carriers and the Air Force are intensified through its bases dispersed in the region.

President Trump therefore invests in Iran’s weakness and the power of the United States of America to withdraw from Tehran what he can by negotiations and under direct threat, which Iranian leadership feels, and achieves his danger in the light of his limited options, and the approach of his political geography, after he was fighting in the background gardens and through the neighboring countries.

Thorny files

By looking at the dialectic of the relationship between Teheran and Washington, and the intersection and separation of interests between them, three thorny files can be monitored between the two parties, namely:

First: the Iranian nuclear file

Washington aspires to dismantle the Iranian nuclear project, while Netanyahu calls for its dismantling and confiscation of its entire parts outside the Iranian territories in a similar state to dismantle the Libyan nuclear project, but Tehran, in return, adheres to its nuclear project for peaceful Bazzkian purposes on April 9.

And if Washington accepts the Iranian approach, what are the restrictions and conditions that Washington will remain peaceful, and what is the price that Tehran will demand in exchange for this, and what is the position of Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu on these counter and conditions conditions?

Second: ballistic missiles and their manufacturing system

Another dialectic between the two parties; Tehran is that ballistic missiles are a dissuasive strategic means, in which he has invested a lot of efforts, money and infrastructure, and Iran is unlikely that Iran accept the renunciation of this file, because his loss of his loss, if its American pressures, have managed to put pressure on Syria, Lebanon and can Houthis in Yemen, and they are open files.

Here, the impact of Israel’s position in this regard, which received a large strike of missiles from Iran with hundreds of missiles, including solid missiles which affected the military bases on October 1, 2024, in a qualitative operation called Iran “The sincere promised 2”, during the battle of the flood of Al -aqsa.

Third: the influence of Iran and the network of allies

One of Iran’s power points, which disturbs Washington and Tel Aviv and their friends in the region, is the strength of its influence and its impact on a network of allies and friends in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and the General region.

It is not unlikely that the administration of President Trump demands the disarmament of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Iran ceases to support Hezbollah with weapons and manufacturing technologies) Yemen.

On the other hand, Iran is not interested in this, which is a country qualified in negotiations, and has always played on the rope of time and tamed the commissioner.

Iran’s options

In this context, Iran’s options are difficult and limited, in particular:

• Going to Trump’s conditions and withdraw, in exchange for removing the sanctions for them, and to concern its internal conditions far from its strong regional influence by the revolutionary guards, and this is unlikely, according to its political faith and its historical experience.
• Maneuver with Washington; He agreed to place restrictions on his nuclear project to maintain him for peaceful purposes. In addition to the commitment not to target Israel through its missile system, as happened in October 2024, as long as Israel has not made provocative violations.

As for the network of its allies in the region, in particular in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, Iran can shed light by reducing the size of its support for them, but one of the contracts will remain, the disarmament of Hezbollah, as Israel and the American administration wish it, and transform it into a Lebanese political component without net military teeth which can threaten the security of Israel later.

In this context, it was remarkable that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said to Al-Jazeera (14-4-2025), that there was a dialogue that took place with Hezbollah on exclusive weapons, stressing that the decision to limit arms in the hands of the state was taken, and its implementation is by dialogue and far from power.

The options in front of Tehran are difficult, and they walk with Washington on a clean edge and a lightness. Will he succeed in joining his policies and strategic details at the negotiating table, with a little concessions and tactical maneuvers with Washington, and his temptation of economic partnerships of billions of dollars in the field of energy and infrastructure in Iran, while some Iranian officials have spoken?

Or will he sail on another path, in which his external regional policies have changed, and he abandons part of his subjective power linked to the nuclear project and his missile system to avoid climbing and self-protection and by opening a new agreement with the United States of America after a long-term rivalry?

Or will negotiations fail and will take us days towards an unwanted military escalation, Iran and Arabic because of its catastrophic economic and security implications on the region?