December 8, 2024 was not an ordinary day in the history of the Syrian people. The collapse of the Baath regime and the Assad family in Syria represents an important turning point and victory after fourteen years of revolution led by the Syrian people. Overthrow the tyrannical regime, during which Syrians paid off thousands of their sons and daughters, and more than ten million were displaced, whether within Syria or to other parts of the world.
But this issue, which appears to be purely Syrian, is in reality a political earthquake in the Middle East region, and goes even beyond to contribute to new developments at the global level and a change in the nature of alliances. . who will be affected by this collapse and by the nature of the alliances that will emerge from it.
The end and fall of the Baath Party in Syria heralded the decline of Iranian influence in two Arab capitals, Damascus and Beirut, out of the four capitals that Iran controlled over the past decade: Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sanaa. With the decline of this influence in Syria and the acceleration occurring in Lebanon, the question arises of the capacity of this influence to persist in the other two capitals in the face of a marathon of regional and international changes.
The characteristics of this influence began to take shape before the start of the Arab Spring, more precisely in 2003, with the fall of the Baath regime in Iraq. This article seeks to analyze the roots of the facts that led to the announcement of the decline of Iranian influence in Syria and Lebanon, and how Iran failed to prevent the decline of this influence despite political investments , economic and security in the country. Syrian regime for over 44 years.
Iraq is the key to secrecy
The Syrian-Iranian relationship can only be understood by understanding the contradiction between the Ba’ath regime in Syria and the Ba’ath regime that existed in Iraq, as well as the deterioration of relations between Iran and Iraq with the establishment of the Islamic Republic.
The presence of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq was a major driver in advancing relations between the Assad family in Syria and the Islamic Republic, particularly at a time when Iran hoped to establish relations with the western Arab Levant, overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. A relationship which adds to its speech of adoption of the defense of Palestinian rights, which would strengthen the internal legitimacy and the image of the political system abroad.
This coincided with the competition between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath parties to adopt the Palestinian cause, with the general perception being that Iraqi support for the Palestinian right was stronger than that of Syria at the time.
Through this relationship, Iran was able to find refuge for Shiites opposed to the Ba’ath regime in Iraq, and it was also able to make a breakthrough on the Iraqi political scene. Furthermore, he was able to build strong bridges with Palestinian liberation and resistance movements, starting with the Palestine Liberation Organization in Beirut and ending with the Islamic resistance movement Hamas.
In the context of the sectarian dimension first, then the resistance discourse then, it established a strong relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon, where Syria provided it with a political and military supply bridge.
Until 2003, Iraq remained at the heart of the development of Syrian-Iranian relations, but the collapse of the Baath regime in Iraq caused these relations to lose one of their most important original levers, and Iraq everything has become an arena of Iranian influence. , and perhaps at a lower cost than the relationship with Syria, but the US presence in Iraq has been an obstacle to Iran exercising its full influence.
The importance of Syria has not completely disappeared from the map of Iranian influence, as evidenced by the Iranian Republic’s adoption of a policy of direct military intervention to defend the Syrian regime, although this has was made ostensibly at the call of the deposed president. Bashar al-Assad in 2012.
The so-called “war on terror” in western Iraq and then in eastern Syria gave Iran an excellent opportunity to renew and strengthen its influence in both countries after 2014 , especially since this war took place in the context of an international war. coalition led by Washington.
Iran has presented itself as a regional actor harmed by terrorist groups and capable of helping. Through this strategy, Iran has strengthened its influence in Syria and Iraq. He also managed to present a strong speech in Iran on Iranian foreign policy in these two countries. , dispelling any doubt that opponents of the regime might raise.
Fear of changing the status quo
Iran has intensified its political, security and military efforts; To maintain the status quo in which he established his influence in Syria, he began by establishing a narrative on the Syrian protests against the Assad regime, describing them as being directed against the so-called axis of resistance led by Tehran, ignoring oppression and tyranny. to which the Syrians were subjected.
Adopting this discourse and linking it to the UN war and the international coalition against terrorism pushed him into the “lizard hole”, because continuing to support the Assad regime was a political and security escape, and at the same time withdraw its support. will lead to a decline that Tehran has long tried to delay.
The Iranian intervention in Syria has made the Islamic Republic an easy target for Israel, which perhaps did not expect such a thing. The more Tehran increases its presence on Syrian soil, the more targets the Israelis bomb.
These Israeli attacks increased exponentially after 2015, with the military presence of Hezbollah, as well as what Iran called military advisers providing support to the Syrian regime. To keep it together.
Iran and its allies (Hezbollah, Afghan militias and others) have paid a human price for their policy in Syria, as statistics indicate the deaths of more than 2,300 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and around 2,000 members of the Afghan Fatemiyoun brigade who were fighting. in Syria, while others were killed. Around 1,000 Hezbollah fighters.
The Islamic Republic has lost morally; Due to his unwavering support for the Syrian regime and his neglect of Syrians’ aspirations for freedom from tyranny, he forgot or ignored what Iranians themselves did when they resisted the tyranny of the Pahlavi monarchy and established the Islamic Republic.
This neglect has left the question open: what did Tehran’s decision-makers miss when they chose to defend tyranny? Was the decision based on the interest of the revolution or the interest of the state?
What I believe is that the principle was the interest of the image of the revolution and its ideological system, which faces a feeling of threat, and in such cases the alternatives are generally absent, this which results in a loss.
As for regimes that think from the point of view of state interest, they usually have one or more alternatives that reduce their losses and protect them from a devastating loss in terms of image and influence.
This loss was reinforced when the Islamic Republic failed to maintain sufficient harmony in its support for the Palestinian cause, while its relations with Hamas, which did not support the Syrian regime in its policies towards of the Syrians, have deteriorated, but have not been completely broken.
Iran – according to available information – has not pressured the Assad regime to stop attacks on places where Palestinian refugees live in the Yarmouk camp and elsewhere, which turned out to have been subjected to what seems like a silent genocide.
It has become clear that there is what can be called a “phobia” of changing the existing situation, especially if Tehran has no part in the emergence of a new situation or development.
Iran therefore welcomed the change in Iraq. Because he produced a reality that met his interests, compared to the Iraq of the Baath Party. But she was very perplexed by the Arab Spring, before siding with its interests to the detriment of values in its relations with its countries. While being positively open to what was happening in Bahrain, she adopted a completely hostile position towards Syria. movement, and then considered that it was supported by the United States and accused Turkey of being in its Islam, but representing American Islam.
The “fear” of a change in the status quo continued and extended until the Al-Aqsa Flood. Despite its declared political support, Iran does not appear to favor changing the status quo in Gaza, nor the weakening of Hezbollah’s power resulting from Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
conclusion
It appears that the decline of Iranian influence was only the result of strategies devoid of alternatives and a deep understanding of the rapid changes in the Middle East region. It also began with a moral loss in the absence of harmony in the “defense of the oppressed”. and the oppressed. » The power of tyrants is no different from the power of occupiers.
In the same context, this decline in Syria and Lebanon is only the beginning, as it represents the collapse of one of the most important foundations of Iranian national security theory after the Iran-Iraq War, which was based on a presence beyond borders. Face potential dangers and don’t wait for them to approach the border. Perhaps Iraq – according to the data – will be the next step where Iranian influence will face challenges, and perhaps difficult tests.
Any development of Iranian influence in Iraq will be linked to developments in U.S.-Iraqi and U.S.-Iranian relations under the U.S. administration of forty-seventh President Donald Trump.
The impact of a possible military confrontation between Iran and Israel should not be ignored.
The views expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of the Al Jazeera network.