Khartoum- Amjad Farid, executive director of the Idea Center for Studies and Development and former adviser to the Office of former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdouk, said that the management of the rapid support forces and political and military factions to form a parallel government, a attempted reproduction of the “Libyan model”.
Farid said in an interview with Al -jazeera net that “quick support is trying to appear in a new political face after his military retirement, and her moral burn, and will not provide anything to the citizen, because she has no solutions to any problem,” said Farid in an interview with Al -jazeera Net.
Farid described what Abdullah Hamdouk, head of the Civil Democratic Forces Alliance of the Revolutionary Forces (Samoud), describes as legitimate peace and does not have new ones, but rather as an attempt to find a foot in the political process.
And on the opportunities to achieve compatibility between civil forces for the post period, Farid explained that it depends The forces of freedom and change And its identification with “rapid support” allowed the forces of the Old Regime of Islamists to present themselves to the people.
The following is the text of the dialogue:
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How do you see the war course in Sudan two years after his epidemic in Khartoum before expanding to other states?
Of course, war has doubled the suffering of Sudanese, and more its negative effects and its complications increase, as well as famine in several regions, but the political treatment of the crisis is useless, and work should be worked to solve the human problem, and the government party should face the problem of pragmatism to serve citizens.
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Do you think that after the military balance became in favor of the army, the release of the states of Sennar and the island, the majority of the state of Khartoum, and the lifting of the siege on white in the north of Kordofan, could be pushed to peace?
Civil forces should not be concerned about the military balance of any party, and I do not think that the war will have a military end, but not in terms of the accused who wants to use war to reach his political agenda, but it is clear that the army that the army found themselves returned to life and have become almost normal, and that there is a popular relief for that, unlike rapid support.
Just as war broke out for political reasons, it needs a political solution, not an equation to share power and wealth between the army and rapid support.
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What is a political solution to the crisis, a colony between the army and rapid support?
The political solution means to dismantle the institutional presence of rapid support militarily, politically and economically, and will return to achieve the slogan of the Revolution “The military for the barracks and the Janjaids dissolves”, within the framework of the institutional reform of the apparatus of the State so that war does not return again.
And I believe, that any attempt to find an agreement between the army and the rapid support will encourage the transport of weapons to carry out political gains and to increase the military political ambition, as has happened in the coup of a president. State council And the army commander, Abdel -Fattah Al -Burhan, and the fast support commander Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, “Hamidati” On October 25, 2021, then “Hamidati” tried to control power in the midst of April 2023, which led to the start of the war.
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In your opinion, what are the real reasons for the division of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Progress) to the Alliance of the Civil Forces of the Forces of the Revolution (firmness), and to the establishment of a new entity between some of the “progress” factions and the rapid support forces in the “Foundation”?
The “Progress” alliance Since its creation, he has brought a germ inherited in the forces of freedom and change, which sought to marry an interest with Abdullah Hamdouk because she thought he had international prayers and acceptance, and in return Hamdouk sought to find an institutional platform in the sudden crisis, and therefore it was an alliance of interest without a common idea.
The coalition also included personalities and factions – linked to the rapid support forces – who took advantage of the coalition to afford politically, which fueled its political ambition, and increased the ceiling of its requests, until it was fully stored with rapid support, and was involved with it, benefiting from the political empowerment of the “progress” coalition.
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Do you not think that Sudan Conflict Alliance known as the “creation” of an attempt to wash the rapid support forces of its crimes?
Rapid support after his moral fall and the crimes he committed, then fell militarily, he seeks a political interface to continue the war, forming a parallel government and absorbing the forces and factions with him, and by referring his executives and his elements in the political and social way.
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What are the repercussions of disintegration in the coalition organization for the second time on its political project and the impacts of its signing of an agreement with rapid support to form a parallel government?
Despite the division between Tiary “Samoud” and “Estabor”, the new coalition leaders with rapid support indicate that they meet the first current in the targets, and this means continuing coordination, but the “founder” alliance is a military entity, and I do not know how civil and political powers are to approach the data of civilian armed conflicts.
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Abdullah Hamdouk, head of the Civil Alliance of the Revolutionary Forces (Samoud), highlighted a 4 -point peace project.
I have not seen an integrated Hamdouk project for peace, but there is nothing new, which is an extension of its positions since the start of the war, and he sought to create a “stage fright, man of man is not equal to them.
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After vast international and regional powers, refuse to form a parallel government in rapid support areas. Do you see in the future of this next government?
The justification for the formation of a parallel government which does not have the objective logic in the treatment of reality, because this government has no solution to the problems it has raised, or to answer questions from the habitat, which is a new political platform for rapid support in order to continue the war. The peace industry is not fulfilled by an alliance between military factions which are fighting to defeat the army.
It is also an attempt to reproduce the Libyan model and is not surprising.
In addition, rapid support has attempted to use a discourse that speaks of marginalization and lack of justice in development, which are real problems, but it does not express them, but that its origins and practices were against the margins, which require the problems of the conflict, the margin and the balance of development to seriously address itself in the context of resolving the defect in the sudden state and allowing its political exploitation.
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The national and community forces of the Sudan port – supporting the army – adopted a political document and called for a “Sudanese inside the country which does not exclude anyone,” can it be a basis for a full political process?
These forces are not very different from the premises of the position of Abdullah Hamdouk, because they also look for a foot in the political arena.
The contradictions on the Sudanese scene must face them clearly, and a political unity cannot be reached by determining a political process before before understanding the fundamental questions.
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About two years after the war, political parties are still unable to sit around a table to agree on a political project on the administration of the post-war country, what is the reason for your belief?
The reason is the conflict between the political forces on an unknown authority “in search of sovereignty over ashes,” explains the poet Mahmoud Darwish, because there is no single representative of the political community, and the dispute between political forces is natural and legitimate.
The attempt to monopolize the voice of civilians of any party or to liquidate the political differences and the use of the war to carry out unpaid political gains.
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The end of the war needs a project that answers questions the next day, which is absent so far, when this project is reached?
Sudan has not had a national project since its independence about 70 years ago, and the end of the war requires a vision made by a large national consensus, preceded by the answer to 4 fundamental questions: the position of civilians on the army and the role of its leadership in the transition phase and beyond, and its donation in politics. The position on rapid support and the end of its institutional existence. How to manage the Islamic movement in its different forms and its role in the regime of the isolated president Omar Al -Bashir in 30 years. The position towards international and regional powers and what is a benign intervention in Sudanese affairs, malicious intervention and determination of “red lines” in this.